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Introduction
In February of 1992, the United States signed the Convention for the Con-
servation of Anadromous Stocks in the North Pacific Ocean (the 1992
North Pacific Salmon Treaty), an international agreement that prohibits
* J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School, 1995; BA, Wittenberg University, 1992.
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fishing for salmon on the high seas of the North Pacific Ocean.' The
United States had pushed for such a ban on high seas salmon fishing for
decades.2
Salmon are an anadromous species, meaning they are born in fresh
waters, migrate to the ocean for most of their lives, and later return to
fresh waters to spawn.3 States-of-origin for anadromous fish want to
receive the "full social, economic and recreational benefits" from salmon
bred in their territory.4 Problems arise when the salmon migrate into the
high seas; any state's fishing vessel can then harvest any state-of-origin's
resource. Such high seas fishing is inefficient.5 Since salmon migrate
back to the coasts upon reaching maturity, salmon caught on the high seas
are not yet fully grown and do not produce the highest possible yield for
each fish.6 High seas fishing also multiplies the problems associated with
management programs for salmon stocks. 7 Coastal states create and
implement conservation plans for their own salmon stocks, such as enforc-
ing quotas and restricting the dates when fishing is allowed. On the high
seas, however, salmon from different states-of-origin mingle and are diffi-
cult to distinguish. Therefore, high seas catches of salmon from different
states-of-origin interfere with the management efforts of those states.
In the United States, the fishing industry has long played an impor-
tant role in the economies of northwest states such as Alaska, Washington,
Oregon, and Idaho.8 The U.S. government has consistently maintained
that high seas fishing for anadromous species is "irrational" because it
interferes with coastal management and conservation efforts.9 In accord-
ance with this logic, neither Canada, Russia, nor the United States has
maintained or supported a high seas salmon fleet; Japan was the only sig-
1. Convention for the Conservation of Anadromous Stocks in the North Pacific
Ocean, Feb. 11, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Jap.-Rus., art. III, S. TREAny Doc. No. 30, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1992) [hereinafter 1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty].
2. See Constance Sathre, Note, Salmon Interception on the High Seas: A Continuing
Controversy Between the United States and Japan, 16 Euvrt.. L. 731, 745 (1986); William T.
Burke, Anadromous Species and the New International Law of the Sea, 22 OcEAN DEy. & INT'L
L. 95, 130-31 n.156 (1991).
3. Sen. Murkowski Says Quick Senate Approval Needed To Prevent illegal Salmon Catches,
Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), June 19, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Arcnws File.
4. Letter of Submittal, from Dept. of State, accompanying 1992 North Pacific
Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, atvi [hereinafter Dept. of State Letter]. Astate-of-origin is
the country containing the inland stream where an anadromous fish is hatched.
5. Sathre, supra note 2, at 746. A 1980 study estimated that U.S. inland catches of
chinook salmon would have been 6.5 times greater than catches on the high seas if the
salmon had grown to maturity and returned to the stream of their birth. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, Why Study Pacific Salmon Law?, 22 IDAHo L. Rav. 629
(1986).
9. Dept. of State Letter, supra note 4, at v. Unregulated fishing would disrupt con-
servation programs, such as quota systems, thereby depleting salmon populations and
destroying the industry for all fishermen, both from the coastal country and on the
high seas.
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natory country to the new treaty that formerly supported such a fleet.10
The new treaty prohibits high seas salmon fishing, thereby conserving
salmon stocks for the coastal countries to fish within their 200-mile exclu-
sive economic zones and preserving the benefits of this natural resource
for states-of-origin. 11
The salmon fishing industry generates hundreds of millions of dollars
for the Pacific Northwest every year.12 Thousands of people are employed
on the water fishing for salmon, while thousands more people are
employed on land in the processing and distribution of salmon.'i Recrea-
tional salmon fishing also brings hundreds of millions of dollars to the
area; many towns base their entire economies on the salmon industry.14
Each year, federal and state governments spend over $300 million to main-
tain and improve salmon runs in the Pacific Northwest. 15
In addition, salmon play a large role in the history and traditions of
the Pacific Northwest. The cultures of many Northwest Indian tribes
center on salmon both as an essential feature of their diet and as a central
element of their religion. 16 Indian treaties regarding fishing rights have
been active since they were negotiated in the 1850s.' 7 "Because of their
continuing importance to the sport, commerce, culture, and identity of
the region, anadromous fish may rightly be considered the Pacific North-
west's most important natural resource-just as they were a century and a
quarter ago .... ."8 The 1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty is an attempt
to protect this natural resource and to secure its benefits for states-of-
origin.
This Note will examine the enforcement provisions of the 1992 North
Pacific Salmon Treaty. These provisions fall into two major categories:
enforcement at sea and enforcement on land. To combat poaching,
salmon-producing states in the North Pacific have traditionally directed
their efforts toward ocean patrols that stop illegal fishermen on the high
seas. 19 The 1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty maintains these traditional
ocean enforcement techniques and also introduces new methods of end-
10. Briefly: Other News, L.A. TiMEs, Oct. 5, 1991, at D2. As of 1991, the Japanese
high seas salmon fleet included 150 boats. Id.
11. See 1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, art. I, pmbl.
12. Thomas C.Jensen, The United States-Canada Pacifc Salmon Interception Treaty: An
Historical and Legal Overview, 16 ENvrT. L. 363, 367-68 (1986). In 1985, American and
Canadian commercial salmon fishermen earned a combined total of $584 million.




15. Todd Campbell, The Snag With Drifinetting-This Chillingly Efficient Fishing
Method Threatens the Pacific Marine Environment SA-r L TimE,Jan. 6, 1991, at Pacific 12.
16. Jensen, supra note 12, at 368.
17. Blumm, supra note 8, at 630-38.
18. Id. at 629-30 (foomote omitted).
19. See International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific
Ocean, May 9, 1952, U.S.-Can.-Jap., 4 U.S.T. 381, T.IA.S. No. 2786, amended Apr. 25,
1978, 30 U.S.T. 1095, T.IA.S. No. 9242, amendedAnnex, May 1986, 27 I.LM. 849 (1988)
[hereinafter 1952 North Pacific Convention].
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ing trade in illegally caught salmon through signatory legislation and regu-
latory programs that oversee the salmon market. One of these market
programs requires certificates-of-origin for all signatory salmon exports to
authenticate legally caught salmon. With a coordinated effort by the sig-
natory countries, on-land market enforcement techniques will prove to be
a valuable addition to international regulation of North Pacific salmon
stocks.
Part I of this Note recounts the history of the fishing industry and past
fishing treaties of the North Pacific from the perspectives of both North
American-Japanese relations and Russo-Japanese relations. Part II
describes the new provisions of the 1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty and
highlights its differences from the previous treaty. In part III, this Note
examines the problem of illegal salmon fishing and related issues. Part IV
explores the enforcement provisions of the Treaty, both at sea and on
land. A program to enforce this treaty through the market will work to fill
the gaps in enforcement left by ocean patrol methods; however, such a
program will be ineffective without a concerted effort by the signatories to
establish and maintain it.
I. History of Fishing Agreements in the North Pacific
A. North American-Japanese Relations
The waters off of the Alaskan coast offer one of the world's richest fisher-
ies.20 The first American salmon canneries opened in Washington and
Oregon in the 1860s.21 Alaskan canning started in 187822 and soon led
the world's markets by producing more than six times the volume of
salmon than all the other states combined.23 The fisheries were the back-
bone of the Alaskan economy.2 4
In the 1930s, the Japanese began sending fishing boats into North
American waters, specifically the Bristol Bay area of Alaska.25 Although
the Japanese government claimed that it had sent the vessels to conduct a
"scientific survey," the fishing vessels involved in the expedition managed
to catch some salmon as well.26 At that time, American fishermen were
constrained by the White Act of 1924, which limited salmon catches to fifty
percent of the available fish in order to maintain the size of the stock.27
20. HOMER E. GREGORY & KATHLEEN BARNES, NORTH PACInC FISHERIES 7 (1939).
The abundance of fish resources contributed to the U.S. decision to purchase Alaska
from Russia in 1867. Jozo TOMASEVICH, INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON CONSERVATION
OF MARINE RESOURCES 225 (1943).
21. TOMASEVICH, supra note 20.
22. Id.; CA.RL I. WicK, OcEAN HARvEsr 11 (1946).
23. L. LARRY LEONARD, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF FISHERIES 123 (1944).
24. Id.; WicK, supra note 22, at 11-16.
25. LEONARD, supra note 23, at 3-4.
26. Philip C.Jessup, Editorial Comment, The Pacfic Coast Fisheries, 33 AM.J. INT'L L.
129, 132 (1939).
27. See White Act, Pub. L. No. 68-204, 43 Stat. 464 (1924) (codified at 48 U.S.C.
§§ 221-28 (1926)). 48 U.S.C. § 225 was repealed by Act of Sept. 4, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-
296, 71 Stat. 617. Because Alaska was admitted to the Union, Congress deleted the
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Therefore, the suspicion that the Japanese were taking salmon in disre-
gard of the laws that restricted American fishermen multiplied the resent-
ment already present in the industry against the Japanese. 28
After the U.S. State Department issued a statement to the Japanese
government on the subject, Japan and the United States came to a "gentle-
men's agreement" whereby Japan stopped its "scientific survey" and
refused to license its citizens to fish in the Bristol Bay area.2 9 This did not
resolve the dispute, however, and negotiations continued until they were
interrupted by World War II. Negotiations resumed once again after the
war in 1946.30 The first success finally came in 1952 with the signing of
the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North
Pacific Ocean (1952 North Pacific Convention).31
The 1952 North Pacific Convention bound the United States, Canada,
and Japan to a new concept in fisheries regulation: abstention.3 2 The
Convention allowed states-of-origin the full economic benefit of fish
resources that thrived as a result of their research and regulation, 3 while
it compelled other states to abstain from fishing those stocks unless the
state-of-origin could not fish up to the maximum sustainable yieldm
The original Convention imposed abstention upon Japan in waters
east of 175 west longitude,3 5 but research soon uncovered that many
North American salmon migrate west of that line.3 6 The Japanese contin-
ually resisted attempts to renegotiate the treaty to protect more North
American salmon, but the parties finally amended the treaty in 1978, mov-
remaining sections of the White Act from the United States Code. LEONARD, supra note
23, at 3.
28. LEONARD, supra note 23, at 3.
29. Jessup, supra note 26, at 132-33.
30. Convention for the Conservation of Anadromoua Stocks in the North Pacific Ocean
(Treaty Doc. 102-30): Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. 15 (1992) [hereinafter Senate Hearing].
31. 1952 North Pacific Convention, supra note 19. The North Pacific Convention
entered into force on June 12, 1953. Id.
32. Id. art. IX; WALTER B. PARKER, ALASKA AND THE LAW OF THE SEA: INTERNATIONAL
FISHEIEs REGIMES OF THE NORTH PAcIFIc 23 (1974); RIcHARD VAN CLEVE & RALPH W.
JOHNSON, MANAGEMENT OF THE HIGH SEAS FISHERIES OF THE NORTHEASTERN PACIFIC 1
(1963).
33. PARKER, supra note 32.
34. 1952 North Pacific Convention, supra note 19, art. IV; VAN CLEVE &JOHNSON,
supra note 32, at 34. The 1952 North Pacific Convention created the International
North Pacific Fisheries Commission to conduct research of regional fish stocks. 1952
North Pacific Convention, supra note 19, arts. U1-Ill. The Commission made the deter-
mination of whether a fish species was being fished to the maximum sustainable yield,
thereby qualifying it for abstention by foreign fishers. Id. art. Ill. Maximum sustainable
yield is a mathematically calculated level of harvest that maintains the optimum produc-
tivity of a fishery over time. See VAN CLEVE & JOHNSON, supra note 32, at 19-23.
35. 1952 North Pacific Convention, supra note 19, Protocol.
36. PARKER, supra note 32, at 24; Senate Hearing, supra note 30. In some years, the
Japanese take of Alaskan salmon may have exceeded the North American inland
catches; Alaskan fisheries may have lost up to ten million fish per year. Id. at 18.
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ing the abstention line approximately 500 miles to the west.3 7 This pro-
tected more North American salmon on the high seas from Japanese
fishing, but not all.38 Nevertheless, the amended treaty was one step
closer to the U.S. goal of a ban on Japanese directed fishing of North
American stocks.3 9
Subsequent negotiations further limited Japanese access to North
American fishing stocks. During 1985-86, North American and Japanese
negotiations resulted in a schedule to phase out Japanese fishing on the
high seas in the Bering Sea by 1994.40 An amended annex to the 1952
North Pacific Convention moved the abstention line again to 174 degrees
east longitude and increased scientific studies of fish migration patterns.
4 1
The amendment phased out high seas fishing in the Bering Sea east of 180
degrees by 1988 and west of 180 degrees by 1994.42
B. Russo-Japanese Relations
The Japanese began salmon fishing along the Siberian and Kamtchatkan
coasts in the early seventeenth century.43 After the Russo-Japanese War,
the Russians conceded fishing rights to the Japanese by the Treaty of
Portsmouth in 1905.4 After the Russian Revolution, the Soviets reaf-
firmed these Japanese fishing rights through continual renegotiations
until the end of World War II.
4 5
In 1956, the U.S.S.R. prohibited fishing for salmon on the high seas
without its permission, thereby claiming control over high seas stocks of
Soviet origin.46 In 1989, the Soviets refused to allow the Japanese to fish
for Soviet-origin salmon on the high seas after 1992. 47 At the same time,
the Soviets put forward a draft of a new multilateral conservation agree-
ment.48 The United States, Canada, andJapan matched this effort, and in
1990 and 1991, representatives of the four countries met and negotiated a
37. Senate Hearing, supra note 30; 1952 North Pacific Convention, supra note 19,
Amended Protocol. The new treaty moved the abstention line from 175 west longitude
to 175 east longitude. Id. art. XI.
38. See Francisco Orrego Vicuna, International Cooperation in Salmon Fisheries and a
Comparative Law Perspective on the Salmon and Ocean Ranching Industry, 22 OcEAN DEv. &
INT'L L. 133, 134 (1991).
39. Senate Hearing, supra note 30, at 16.
40. Id. at 18.
41. 1952 North Pacific Convention, supra note 19, Amended Annex, para. 1; Sathre,
supra note 2, at 748.
42. 1952 North Pacific Convention, supra note 19, Amended Annex, para. 1; Sathre,
supra note 2, at 743.
43. PARKER, supra note 32, at 23.
44. Treaty of Peace Between Japan and Russia (Treaty of Portsmouth), Sept. 5,
1905, Jap.-Rus., 199 Consol. T.S. 144.
45. PARKER, supra note 32, at 23; see, e.g., LEoNARD, supra note 23, at 27-34. Fishery
rights were a symbol of the political power struggle in northeast Asia. Id. at 34.
46. Burke, supra note 2, at 130-31 n.156.
47. Dept. of State Letter, supra note 4, at vi.
48. Id.
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new convention to conserve anadromous stocks in the North Pacific.4 9
C. Customary International Law and Related Issues
Traditionally, states had absolute control over their territorial seas, which
today, under customary international law, extend twelve miles from the
shoreline of each state.50 States could either bargain away those exclusive
rights through international agreements, or they could monopolize the
available resources.5 ' However, states could not exercise their jurisdiction
on the high seas, which were defined as any waters outside of the territo-
rial seas.52 Nations respected freedom of the high seas, especially for
fishing.55
In the past few decades, that view has changed. All states-of-origin for
salmon agree that there is no longer a right to fish for salmon on the high
seas.5 4 Instead, nations wanting to fish salmon stocks that originate in
another state must first obtain permission from the state-of-origin.55
The consensus that there is no longer a right to fish for anadromous
stocks on the high seas began to develop among states-of-origin in 1976,
when the United States unilaterally created a 200-mile Fishery Conserva-
tion Zone (FCZ).5 6 In the Fishery Conservation and Management Act
49. Id. The Russian Federation, rather than the U.S.S.R., was the signatory to the
new North Pacific Salmon Treaty because it was signed in 1992, after the dissolution of
the Soviet Union. The other signatories recognized the Russian Federation as the
proper party to the treaty. Senator Murkowski expressed this acceptance at the hearing
before the Committee on Foreign Relations regarding the 1992 Treaty:
[The treaty] recognizes the extremely important role of the Russian federation
[sic] as a producer of wild Pacific salmon and makes the federation [sic] a full
partner in this new conservation enterprise. I think it is particularly notewor-
thy, Mr. Chairman, that we had the President of the Russian Republic, Presi-
dent Yeltsin, before us today.
Senate Hearing, supra note 30, at 2.
50. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, arts. 2-3, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.62/122 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter UNCLOS);
SHIGERU ODA, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF SEA RESOURCES 13 (1963). The reach of the
territorial sea has been an evolving issue in international law. In the early twentieth
century, some nations challenged the traditional three-mile limit and extended their
territorial sea to 12 miles. Id. at 15-20.
In 1945, only two nations, or 5% of total coastal or island nations, claimed terri-
torial seas measuring twelve miles in breadth. By 1979, seventy-six nations, or
58% of all coastal nations, claimed twelve-mile seas. Finally by early 1989 a total
of 108 nations, or 75% of all nations, were claiming territorial seas of twelve
miles breadth. The twelve-mile sea was thus viewed by a majority of nations as
an appropriate replacement for the "retiring" three-mile limit.
RobertJay Wilder, The Three-Mile Territorial Seaw Its Origins and Implications for Contempo-
rary Offshore Federalism, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 681, 686-87 (1992).
51. ODA, supra note 50, at 13.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Burke, supra note 2, at 118.
55. Id.
56. Sathre, supra note 2, at 739; Moritaka Hayashi, Fisheries in the North Pacfic: Japan
at a TurningPoin 22 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 343, 349 (1991);John Warren Kindt, The
Law of the Sea: Anadromious and Catadrnous Fish Stocks, Sedentary Species, and the Highly
Migratory Species, 11 SvRACUSEJ. INT'L L. & COM. 9, 14 (1984); William 0. McLean &
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(FCMA), the United States professed to have "exclusive management
authority" over all fish within 200 miles of its coastlines and over any anad-
romous fish of American origin, wherever they were on the high seas.57
The U.S.S.R., Japan, and Canada, the other major states-of-origin for
North Pacific salmon, each created their own 200-mile FCZs in 1977.58
A state-of-origin claim of exclusive management authority over fish
does not prevent fishing by other nations. Rather, it requires nations to
obtain permission from the state-of-origin to fish those stocks. The United
States has negotiated several bilateral agreements granting permission to
fish within the U.S. fishery conservation zone.5 9 Japan and the U.S.S.R.
negotiated Governing International Fishery Agreements (GIFAs) with the
United States,60 while the 1985 Pacific Salmon Interception Treaty gov-
erns fishing rights between the United States and Canada.6 '
The right to fish for salmon on the high seas continued to erode
when the United Nations opened its Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) for signature in 1982.62 Until it came into force on November
16, 1994, the United States recognized the non-seabed provisions of
UNCLOS as customary international law.63 In fact, UNCLOS is substan-
Sompong Sucharitkul, Fisheries Management and Development in the EEZ: The North, South,
and Southwest Pacific Experience, 63 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 492, 507 (1988); A 200-Mile
Limit to Protect U.S. Fishing Rights, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., Feb. 9, 1976, at 30.
57. Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882, 1821 (1988
& Supp. V 1993).
58. Hayashi, supra note 56, at 349.
59. Kindt, supra note 56, app. III, at 45.
60. Id.; see, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of Japan Concerning Fisheries Off the Coasts of the
United States of America, Sept. 10, 1982, U.S.-Jap., 34 U.S.T. 2059, amended Hein's No.
KAV 1089, extended Hein's No. KAV 1089, 1090; Agreement Between the Government of
the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics Concerning Fisheries Off the Coasts of the United States, Nov. 26, 1976, U.S.-
U.S.S.R., 2 U.S.T. 1847, amended T.I.A.S. Nos. 10531, 11028, extended Hein's No. KAV
1801, 1082, 1083.
61. Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Gov-
ernment of Canada Concerning Pacific Salmon, Jan. 28, 1985, U.S.-Can., S. TRna-w
Doc. No. 2, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
62. UNCLOS, supra note 50. One hundred and fifty-nine nations have signed the
Convention, but it was only in November of 1993 that the required sixtieth nation rati-
fied it. Steven Greenhouse, U.S. Aides Report Compromise on Sea Mining, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar.
10, 1994, at A10. The Convention came into force on November 16, 1994, one year
after ratification by the required 60 signatories. Bruce Clark, Law of the Sea Promises
Many Disputes, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1994, at 6.
63. Senate Hearing supra note 30, at 13. The United States did not sign the Conven-
tion in 1982 because of objections to part XI regarding deep seabed mining. Id.
On July 28, 1994, the United Nations adopted an agreement that amended part XI.
The United States, along with 44 other nations, signed the agreement. Testimony of
Ambassador David A. Colson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans, Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations 1, Aug. 11, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws
File [hereinafter Colson Senate Testimony].
The original Convention established a global seabed mining consortium designed to
distribute proceeds to poorer nations. Part of these proceeds were royalties collected
from the mining companies of industrialized nations, such as the United States. Green-
house, supra note 62. "Under the new version of the treaty, technology does not have to
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tially the same as the uncodified customary international practice regard-
ing anadromous fish and fishing on the high seas.6 However, the
Convention abandoned the concept of 200-mile Fishery Conservation
Zones (FCZs) for that of 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs).
Within the EEZs, coastal states have authority over more than just fishing
rights-all "natural resources, whether living or non-living" within the EEZ
fall under the control of the coastal state. 65 The United States adopted its
200-mile EEZ in 1983.66
Article 66(1) of UNCLOS grants states-of-origin "primary interest in
and responsibility for" anadromous stocks.6 7 Article 66(3) (a) states that
nations may fish for anadromous stocks only in areas landward of the 200-
mile EEZ.68 High seas fishing (beyond the EEZ) requires negotiation with
the state-of-origin, 69 which has responsibility for conservation measures.70
In effect, high seas fishing must be acceptable to the state-of-origin, and it
is susceptible to restrictions necessary for conservation. 7 1
Article 66(3) (b) creates an exception to the foregoing provisions by
requiring states-of-origin to consider any "economic dislocation" that may
occur by virtue of a ban on high seas fishing for anadromous species. 72
Japanese claims of economic hardship prompted this exception. Conse-
quently, states-of-origin following UNCLOS agreed to allow Japan to con-
tinue high seas fishing until it could phase out the practice. 73 Knowing
that it could not rely for long on its tenuous argument of economic hard-
ship,74 Japan successfully completed its phase-out in 1991. 75 Therefore,
Japan can no longer rely on the economic dislocation exception and must
be shared, the U.N.'s oversight role has been reduced, and the United States can veto
treaty decisions of which it disapproves." A Sea Change; The United States Finally Will Sign
a Much-Disputed Treaty, PITSBURGH Posr-GAzETTE, Aug. 22, 1994, at B2. However, com-
mercial seabed mining is not feasible for at least another 15 years. U.N. Amends Seabed
Law, WASH. Posr, July 29, 1994, at A28.
The U.S. Senate is now considering ratifying UNCLOS. See Colson Senate Testimony,
supra. If the Senate does ratify the Convention, the United States will then "accede" to
and be bound by the Convention without actually becoming a signatory. George Mof-
fett, U.S. Accepts Revised Sea-Mining Rules in Controversial Sea Treaty, SAN DIEcO UNION-
Tia., July 29, 1994, at A-20. However, Jesse Helms (R.-N.C.), the new chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has expressed his opposition to UNCLOS. Evans
& Novak (CNN Broadcast, Nov. 19, 1994, Transcript #244), available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File.
64. Burke, supra note 2, at 118.
65. UNCLOS, supra note 50, arts. 55, 56.
66. McLean & Sucharitkul, supra note 56, at 492.
67. UNCLOS, supra note 50, art. 66.
68. Id. art. 66(3)(a).
69. Id.
70. Id. art. 66(1).
71. Burke, supra note 2, at 105.
72. UNCLOS, supra note 50, art. 66(3) (b).
73. Senate Hearing supra note 30, at 4-5.
74. See id. at 5 ("The vision of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention was to phase this
fishery out. Japan has done so, knowing that it could not well rely for long on a tenuous
argument.").
75. Id. at 7; Salmon Conservation Pact To Be Signed Tuesday in Moscow, KYODo Nvs
INT'L, Feb. 17, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Intl File. The Japanese salmon
Cornell International Law Journal
follow the customary international law ban on high seas fishing for anad-
romous species.
II. The New Treaty: Changes from the Old Treaty
The old 1952 North Pacific Convention and its amendments left many
gaps in the administration of salmon conservation efforts. First, it permit-
ted salmon fishing on the high seas west of a certain longitude line.76 This
limited abstention policy was ineffective for the purposes of salmon con-
servation. Second, the North Pacific had two separate regulatory regimes:
the 1952 North Pacific Convention between the United States, Canada,
and Japan, 77 and a separate agreement between the Soviet Union and
Japan. 78 Third, although the international body overseeing the operation
of the Convention made invaluable contributions in marine research, it
did not sufficiently develop and implement enforcement measures for the
Convention. 79 Lastly, the Convention confined its signatories' enforce-
ment power to apprehension at sea and did not provide for enforcement
measures in the marketplace.80
On February 11, 1992, the United States, Canada, Japan, and the Rus-
sian Federation signed the Convention for the Conservation of Anadro-
mous Stocks in the North Pacific Ocean (1992 North Pacific Salmon
Treaty).81 This new treaty supersedes the old 1952 North Pacific
Convention.
A. A Ban on High Seas Salmon Fishing
The most important provision of the 1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty is
its complete ban on high seas salmon fishing.8 2 The ban extends across
the North Pacific Ocean and its adjacent seas north of 33 degrees latitude
and outside the signatories' 200-mile EEZs along their coastlines.83
The United States tried to negotiate a ban on high seas fishing with
Japan for decades,84 but the 1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty was the
first success. One reason forJapan's recent flexibility was its new percep-
tion of itself as a coastal producer of salmon.85 Japan began to worry
fleet was scheduled to be cut back to about 400 vessels, a 50% reduction in two years.
Id.
76. 1952 North Pacific Convention, supra note 19, Protocol.
77. Id.
78. See part I.B.
79. 1952 North Pacific Convention, supra note 19, art. III.
80. Id.
81. 1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1. The treaty was negotiated with
the Soviet Union, but the other signatories agreed to replace the U.S.S.R. with the
Russian Federation. Id. at vi. See supra note 49.
82. See 1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, art. HI; Senate Hearing, supra
note 30, at 1; Dept. of State Letter, supra note 4, at vi. The treaty prohibits catches of
anadromous fish, which includes steelhead trout as well as the different species of
salmon. See Senate Hearing, supra note 30, at 2, 6, 10, 16, 19.
83. 1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, art. I.
84. See Sathre, supra note 2, at 745; Burke, supra note 2, at 130-31 n.156.
85. Senate Hearing, supra note 30, at 5, 7.
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about other fishing nations, such as North and South Korea, catchingJap-
anese native salmon on the high seas.8 6 In order to prevent other nations
from taking its own resources, Japan had to work with the other major
producers of salmon to send a clear message that high seas fishing for
anadromous stocks is unacceptable.8 7
B. The Russian Federation: A New Party
The 1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty saw the addition of the Russian
Federation to the Canadian, Japanese, and American conservation efforts
in the North Pacific.8 8 The thawing of relations between the U.S.S.R. and
the United States in the late 1980s led to negotiations regarding North
Pacific fishing rights, including a Soviet proposal for a multilateral North
Pacific salmon agreement.8 9
The resulting 1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty was an integration of
Soviet conservation efforts with the existing 1952 North Pacific Conven-
tion between Japan, Canada, and the United States.90 The new treaty
includes the four major states-of-origin of salmon stocks.91 There is now
only one coordinated international regime regulating the fishing of anad-
romous stocks in the North Pacific.
C. Creation of the NPAFC
The 1992 Treaty creates a new international body to oversee oceanic
research and international cooperation on fishing issues.92 Named the
North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission (NPAFC), the organization
replaces the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission (INPFC),
which operated under the 1952 North Pacific Convention. 93 The INPFC's
most significant contribution was its scientific research in the fisheries-its
data was important in the negotiation of agreements such as the new 1992
North Pacific Salmon Treaty.9 4 Although the NPAFC will continue the
research and information exchange begun by the INPFC, the NPAFC dif-
fers in four significant aspects.
First, since the new treaty prohibits high seas fishing, the NPAFC will
not have to oversee and controlJapanese salmon catches on the high seas,
assuming its compliance with the treaty.95 Second, the Russian Federation
will now contribute to the research and enforcement efforts of the Coin-
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See 1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1; 1952 North Pacific Conven-
tion, supra note 19. The Soviets were already active in conservation efforts through a
bilateral process with Japan. Senate Hearing, supra note 30, at 6.
89. Senate Hearing supra note 30, at 5, 19.
90. Id. at 6, 19.
91. Id. at 6.
92. 1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, arts. VIII-IX.
93. Senate Hearing, supra note 30, at 27; 1952 North Pacific Convention, supra note
19, arts. II-IV.
94. Senate Hearing, supra note 30, at 17.
95. Id. at 27.
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mission. Third, the NPAFC will coordinate enforcement efforts among
the four signatories, including the development of a common schedule of
penalties for treaty violations.96 Finally, the Commission will also formu-
late a certificate-of-origin program to halt trafficking in illegally caught
salmon.97
D. Enforcement Provisions
Although the new treaty's enforcement provisions are modeled after those
of the 1952 Convention, there are some modifications that give signatories
more power to stop illegal salmon fishing.98 Signatories who find vessels
fishing illegally on the high seas may bring those boats into the enforcing
country's ports and turn the violators over to the appropriate authorities
in their home country for prosecution. 99 Also, the new treaty prohibits
trafficking in illegally caught salmon10 0 and the reflagging of boats under
a nonsignatory country's flag to avoid the ban on high seas fishing.1 1
1H. The Problem: Illegal Salmon Fishing
Illegal salmon fishing on the high seas spawned a highly lucrative black
market for salmon products. 10 2 In 1989, an undercover sting operation
resulted in an offer by a Tokyo-based company to sell twenty-four million
pounds of salmon illegally caught by Taiwanese fishermen. l03 The sale
would have been worth between $36 million and $48 million.' 0 4 "The
money is comparable to the drug business... [, and the fish don't cost
anything, so it is almost pure profit."' 0 5
Illegal fishing issues generally fall into two categories: salmon fishing
by nonsignatories to the 1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty and the reflag-
ging of signatory nations' ships to nonsignatory nations. Similar problems
arose in a related controversy regarding the use of driftnets by commercial
fishermen.
A. Nonsignatory Fishing
Fishing fleets from nonsignatory countries that take treaty-protected
salmon from the high seas pose a problem for signatory countries, which
are prohibited from fishing those areas. However, although nonsignato-
96. Id. at 11, 27; 1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, art. IX(3).
97. Senate Hearing, supra note 30, at 13-14, 27; 1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty,
supra note 1, art. IX(7).
98. Senate Hearing, supra note 30, at 25.
99. 1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, art. V. See also discussion infra
part IV.A.
100. 1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, art. rI(3). See also discussion
infra part II.A.
101. 1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, art. IV(3). See also discussion
infra parts IlI.B, IV.B.
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ries are not bound by the 1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty, they are
bound by customary international law. Under customary international
law, embodied in UNCLOS, 10 6 states-of-origin of anadromous fish have
control of those fish throughout their migratory range, including the high
seas, and catches of salmon are prohibited without the approval of the
state-of-origin. 10 7 Therefore, nonsignatory catches of salmon on the high
seas are as illegal as catches by signatory countries.
Sometimes nonsignatory illegal catches are "laundered" so that the
salmon can be sold in signatory countries.' 0 8 "The Taiwanese appear to
be the worst offenders [of illegal salmon fishing], despite recent efforts by
their government."'1 9 The Taiwanese pirate fleet is estimated at fifty to
ninety vessels."10 In 1991, U.S. government officials were "shocked" when
one Taiwanese newspaper brashly reported that fifty Taiwanese boats had
already illegally fished for salmon in the North Pacific that year."'
B. Reflagging
Reflagging is a common method used by fishermen from countries bound
by international agreements to allow them to fish without interference
106. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
107. Id.
108. Rich Roberts, A Group Policing The Sea, L.A. TIMEs, June 22, 1990, at C1.
In a typical operation, authorities said, the salmon are collected by boats from
Japan, Taiwan or South Korea, transferred to larger mother ships and then
"laundered" back to the fish markets of America and Europe. For example,
since 1985, France has bought an increasing amount of salmon through Singa-
pore, which has no high-seas fishing fleet.
Id. o
A 1990 report from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which
administers fisheries, revealed that during the previous three-and-one-half years, agents
seized 1,296,709 pounds of salmon which had been imported to the United States ille-
gally from Singapore, Hong Kong, and other Asian ports. The fish would have been
exported again, this time to Japan, to be sold as an American product as part of a
"laundering" operation. Nelson Bryant, Net Out for Outlaw Salmon Fishers, N.Y. TimEs,
May 27, 1990, at H10.
In 1991, U.S. federal agents exposed a salmon "laundering" scheme in which it was
alleged that 1.2 million pounds of salmon illegally caught by Taiwanese fishermen were
stored in China and were scheduled to be shipped to Chile, where they would be
repackaged and relabeled before being shipped to the United States as a product of
Chile. Dee Norton, Three Charged in International legal-Salmon Deal, SFAr.TE TIMES, May
13, 1991, at Al.
The Fisheries Council of British Columbia found that illegally taken salmon canned
in Thailand and marked "product of Canada" was being sold in Australia. Gordon Ham-
ilton, Salmon Pirates Scourge of B.C.: Bogus: Special Tins Considered, VANCOUVER SUN, Mar.
4, 1993, at D1.
109. Roberts, supra note 108. The Taiwanese tradition of unrestricted fishing on the
open sea is part of the issue. Id. "[O]ver the last ten years, the Taiwanese have been
the biggest problem 'in terms of renegade, pirate vessels fishing blatantly and directly
for salmon with drift nets.'" Bryant, supra note 108.
110. Dee Norton, Nations Boost Effort To Catch Salmon Pirates, SEATrLE TIMEs, Apr. 13,
1992, at B1.
111. Dee Norton, Bold Report of Illegal Taiwanese Catches, S.ATr. Titms,July 13, 1991,
at A10. The report also stated that each vessel was expected to earn $740,000 (U.S.).
Id.
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from domestic laws.1 12 States that are signatories to international agree-
ments that are not self-executing, such as the 1992 North Pacific Salmon
Treaty, pass internal legislation outlawing their nationals from undertak-
ing'actions prohibited by the agreement.113 To circumvent domestic laws
implementing the treaty, fishermen from a signatory country register their
vessels in a country that is not party to the treaty and has no legislation
prohibiting the desired type of fishing. This practice is called reflagging,




A related problem is the use of driftnets. Driftnets are large panels of net
webbing suspended from the top of the water by floats and weighted at the
bottom so that they hang vertically in the water.1 15 The nets may stretch
112. Under UNCLOS, ships on the high seas are under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the state whose flag they fly. UNCLOS, supra note 50, art. 92(1). Law enforcement
officials therefore lack jurisdiction over and may not board a vessel of a foreign flag
state on the high seas. This situation often arises in drug enforcement. David R. Innis,
The U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Substances and Psychotropic Substances,
37 FED. B. Navs &J. 118 (1990).
U.S. law recognizes a territorial sea of 12 miles. 19 U.S.C. § 1401(j) (1988). Any
vessel of any flag state within those 12 miles is within U.S. customs waters and under
U.S.jurisdiction. 19 U.S.C. § 1401(j); 19 U.S.C. § 1581 (1988). But U.S. law also grants
U.S. jurisdiction over any flag vessel on the high seas with whose flag state the United
States has a "treaty" or "arrangement" allowing U.S. law officials to board and enforce
U.S. law. 19 U.S.C. § 1401(); 19 U.S.C. § 1581.
Therefore, if the U.S. Coast Guard wishes to board a foreign flag vessel on the high
seas but is denied permission to board from the vessel itself, it will request permission to
board from the flag state. The State Department will pursue the request through the
U.S. embassy in the flag state. The flag state will often grant permission promptly by
telephone or cable. This permission constitutes an "arrangement" with the flag state so
that the vessel is now constructively in U.S. customs waters, and the Coast Guard may
board it. See Innis, supra.
113. See, e.g., North Pacific Anadromous Stocks Convention, 16 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5012
(Supp. V 1993).
114. 1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, art. IV(3). In 1990, The Soviet
Union seized a fleet of at least 10 fishing boats flying North Korean flags with a total of
more than 200 crew members, 140 to 170 of which were actually Japanese. It was
revealed that several Japanese fishing companies constrained by Japanese government-
imposed quotas had struck a deal with a North Korean fishing enterprise. In a ruse to
avoid Japanese quotas, the Japanese fishermen gave the North Koreans "technical
assistance." In return, the Japanese fishing boats were painted with North Korean flags.
The fleet fished for salmon of Soviet origin in the North Pacific. Japanese officials
hypothesized that the fishermen felt that the Soviets would not enforce their poaching
laws against North Korean boats because of the two countries' political alliance. They
were wrong.
The catch was sold at Tokyo's fish markets for a profit of tens of millions of dollars
which was split with the North Koreans. The Soviet government considered the fisher-
men guilty of "malicious poaching." Japanese officials promised to punish the fisher-
men if it were determined that they had violated Japanese law. David E. Sanger, North
Pacific Poaching Arsts Have Tokyo Squirming, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1990, at A3.
The boats were held for 10 weeks by the Soviet navy, and the incident caused consid-
erable embarrassment to the Japanese government. Campbell, supra note 15.
115. Hayashi, supra note 56, at 357.
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up to thirty-five miles in length." 6 They drift free in the water and entan-
gle fish so effectively that they have earned the nickname "walls of
death."11 7
In the late 1970s, driftnet use grew quickly after the discovery of large
stocks of squid in the North Pacific." 8 It was primarily Japanese,
Taiwanese, and South Korean vessels that fished for North Pacific squid
with driftnets. n 9 Because driftnets are nonselective, they may trap other
fish besides squid. This can significantly impact salmon stocks. Above
forty degrees north latitude, salmon are the most numerous fish in the
upper waters of the ocean and therefore are likely to be ensnared in
driftnets. °2 0 To prevent the incidental taking of salmon by squid driftnets,
Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea all enacted domestic legislation limiting
driftnetting.' 2 1 However, the migratory range of salmon made it impossi-
ble to prevent all accidental catches of salmon by driftnets. 12 2 Also, some
fleets used squid driftnetting as a cover for driftnet fishing directed at
salmon.' 23
In 1989, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution to prohibit
driftnet fishing by the end of 1992.124 Unfortunately, General Assembly
resolutions such as this are not binding; they serve only as recommenda-
tions.' 2 5 Relatively more significant progress was made the same year after
Canadian and American pressure and a threat of an American trade
embargo persuaded Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea to enter into agree-
ments with the United States that authorize the use of observers and other
methods to enforce a ban on driftnet fishing.' 2 6 Notwithstanding these
successes, the problem persists. Some driftnet fishermen from these states
have reflagged, registering their vessels under Chinese and Honduran
jurisdiction to avoid their own governments' regulations outlawing
116. Campbell, supra note 15.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Burke, supra note 2, at 109.
120. Id.
121. Japan places time and area restrictions on squid driftnetting. "The major thrust
of the time and area restrictions are [sic] to confine the fishery south of the expected
migratory pattern of salmon, utilizing seasonal variations in water temperature to adjust
the northern limit of the squid fishery month by month to avoid significant intercep-
tion of salmon." Id.
Korea does not have time and area restrictions, but it does have regulations prohibit-
ing takings of salmon. Id.
Taiwan has regulated drifmetting since 1981 and has regulations similar to Japan's in
some areas. Id. at 109-10.
122. Id. at 109.
128. Taiwan was most often suspected of using the squid fishery as a cover for
directed salmon fishing. Id. at 127 n.92.
124. Large-Sca/e PelaDrifnet Fishing and Its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of the
World's Oceans and Seas, U.N. Doc. A/C.2/44/L.81 (1989), adopted by U.N. GAOR, 44th
Sess., 85th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/225 (1989); Burke, supra note 2, at 127-28
n.97.
125. Ted L McDorman, Canada and the North Pacify Ocean: Recent Issues, 22 OcEAN
DEv. & INT'L L. 365, 372 (1991).
126. Id. at 371-72.
Cornell International Law Journal
driftnetting. 12 7
IV. Enforcement Issues
The 1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty expands signatory policing powers,
but can the four countries really put a stop to the lucrative black market in
North Pacific salmon? In the new treaty, techniques for enforcement at
sea remain the same as in the 1952 North Pacific Convention, but the
signatories have added new measures to enforce the treaty on land
through the market.
A. Enforcement at Sea
The 1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty allows signatories to board the
ships of other signatories "which can be reasonably believed to be engaged
in directed fishing for ... anadromous fish .... -128 If there is a violation,
the enforcing party may "arrest or seize" the crew or vessel and deliver the
offender to the government of his home state.1 29 The home state (but
not the arresting state, if they are different)13 0 must then prosecute the
offender.13 ' These provisions are substantially the same as those in the
1952 North Pacific Convention and those in the old agreement concern-
ing salmon between the former Soviet Union and Japan-the two North
Pacific regimes that existed before the 1992 North Pacific Salmon
Treaty.'3 2
The treaty covers a vast area of the Pacific Ocean.' 3 3 The biggest
problem facing enforcers is the lack of an adequate number of patrol ves-
sels. For example, the United States deploys no more than two to three
127. Driftnet Use Continues Despite Ban; There Should Be A Crackdown on Flags of Conven-
ience, GAZErrE (MoNrEL), July 19, 1993, at B2.
In May [1993J, the U.S. Coast Guard caught two Chinese-flag boats with
driftnet gear near Alaskan waters, and escorted them back to China. The boats
apparently were linked to a Sino-Taiwanese joint venture. Beijing apologized.
A third boat, flying a Honduran flag, escaped. Its crew also was thought to be
Taiwanese.
Id.
128. 1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, art. V(2) (a).
129. Id. art. V(2) (b).
130. Senate Hearing, supra note 30, at 11.
131. 1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, art. V(2) (c).
132. Burke, supra note 2, at 117; see 1952 North Pacific Convention, supra note 19;
supra part I.B.
133. "We're talking about millions of square miles of ocean [that] we have one or
two aircraft to patrol with and ... one or two vessels." All Things Considered: Salmon
Fishing Pirates To Be Pursued (National Public Radio broadcast, Apr. 14, 1992), available
in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File [hereinafter Pirates To Be Pursued].
A reporter who accompanied a Canadian Armed Forces flight crew on a five day
intelligence mission covering approximately 300,000 square miles in a box 3000 nauti-
cal miles west of Victoria to 1500 nautical miles east of the Japanese island of Hokkaido
described the incredible size of the North Pacific. "[Y]ou're up against a piracy that
happens so far from the nearest port that this CP-140 has to bum two tonnes of fuel per
hour at $1000 per hour for 12 hours just to get here to watch it happen." Terry Glavin
Vansun, Pirates of the Pacific: Every Year, They Kill More Than a Million Birds and Sea Mam-
mals and StealAlmost a Million Kilograms of Salmon, VANcoUvR SUNJuly 13, 1991, at A12.
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Coast Guard vessels in the North Pacific.' T An apprehension under the
treaty requires an actual boarding of the offending fishing boat,'3 5 which
must be done from a surface vessel. It is not sufficient for a Coast Guard
aircraft to fly overhead, record the identification numbers of an offending
boat, and later report the violation to the boat's home state. There must
be an actual boarding.13 6 Given the vast size of the area to be patrolled,
cooperative enforcement techniques and expanded patrol efforts seem to
be necessary for more effective enforcement.
In April of 1992, the four signatories to the treaty met in Seattle,
Washington, to discuss a joint "anti-piracy plan."1 3 7 They decided that
each country would "monitor" a section of the North Pacific Ocean and
that they would share information among themselves.' 3 8 "The enforce-
ment officials will use radios and fax machines to stay in contact so that if a
pirate ship is spotted, the closest enforcement boat, no matter which of
the four nations it's from, can be dispatched to the scene."13 9
The signatories also promised individually to increase policing efforts.
The Russian Federation announced plans to nearly triple its enforcement
vessels.' 40 It now deploys four patrol boats, each with its own helicopter,
and "two or three armed cutters."141 However, the Russian Federation
fleet recently experienced shortages of fuel that disabled some of the
patrol boats and hampered enforcement.' 4 2 The U.S. Coast Guard
increased its flight observation time to 800 hours per month, a forty-five
percent increase, and the Canadians promised to increase their patrol
flight time from 160 to 270 hours per month.43 Japanese domestic law
prevents Japanese officials from boarding foreign vessels, but they agreed
to police Japanese boats and report pirate boats to the proper
countries.144
The signatories employ impressive technology in their enforcement
efforts. Russian planes have aerial photo capability, while American
planes are equipped with $1 million "surface-searching radar" systems,
134. Senate Hearing, supra note 30, at 12. "The Coast Guard usually maintains just
two, sometimes three, cutters on station for the entire region, which Alaskans note, has
more coastline than all the other states combined. This would be something like Cali-
fornia trying to enforce the highway speed limit with just two or three police cruisers."
John Balzar, Industry's Feeding Frenzy Perils Richest U.S. Fishery; Resources: A Showdom
Looms over Practices Some Fear Could Turn North Pacific into a Barren Region, LA TIMES,
June 29, 1992, at Al.
135. Senate Hearing, supra note 30, at 11.
136. Id.
137. Pirates To Be Pursued, supra note 133.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Norton, supra note 110, at B1.
141. Id.
142. Yelena Matveyeva, On the Brink of a Military Conflict on the Sea of Okhotsk, Moscow
NEws, Aug. 18, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File; Natalya Pachegina,
Something to Protect in Russia's North-Eas RuSDATA D1ALNE-BIzEKoN NEws, June 1, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curmws File.
143. Norton, supra note 110, at B1.
144. Id.
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allowing them to search from a high altitude and thereby cover a greater
area.' 45 U.S. Navy satellites have previously assisted the Coast Guard's
drug enforcement operations by tracking boats carrying marijuana.146
Because the satellites cannot spot drugs on ocean-going vessels, they can
only be used to track boats already identified by undercover agents as car-
rying drugs. 14 7 The same problem exists in the salmon piracy context-
the satellites can track salmon pirates but cannot be used to spot them.
Officials of the U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service and the U.S.
Navy's Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command have had "explora-
tory" discussions regarding use of the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS)
to track pirate fishing boats. 14 8 The United Stated developed SOSUS in
the 1950s as a listening device to track Soviet submarines in the Pacific
Ocean. 149 Although it is possible to track fishing boats with the system,
financial barriers may make it an impractical enforcement option.
150
In October of 1993, the National Maritime Intelligence Center
opened in Washington, D.C. 1 5 1 The Center, comprised of a large bank of
computers, is a revolutionary attempt to consolidate maritime intelligence
from the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard in order to enforce
embargoes and sanctions more effectively and to track smugglers and ter-
rorists.' 52 The Center is expanding into nonmilitary areas and will be
cooperating with the Departments of State and Commerce and agencies
such as Customs, Immigration and Naturalization, and Drug Enforce-
mert.15 3 An information network of this magnitude could be an invalua-
ble tool for identifying and tracking illegal fishing boats in the North
Pacific.
Although there have been advances in technology and cooperation
for ocean patrols, the size of the North Pacific makes enforcement at sea
difficult. Coordination of air patrols with surface vessels and the addition
145. Id. Injuly of 1991, a Coast Guard C-130 patrol flight located 26 pirate vessels on
radar. A surface vessel was notified, but by the time it arrived, all but three boats had
fled. U.S. officials boarded ajapanese boat, the DaianMaru, and searched it, finding 12
tons of frozen salmon. The boat was taken back to Japan. Campbell, supra note 15.
146. Thomas O'Toole, Satellites Used To Round Up U.S.-Bound Marijuana Ships, WASH.
PosT, July 11, 1978, at Al; Alan Cowell, Heroin Pouring Through Porous European Borders,
N.Y. Tismss, Feb. 9, 1993, at A3.
147. O'Toole, supra note 146.
148. Dee Norton, Sensors May Help Track Drift-Net Fleets-Sub Detectors Can Track Boats,
SErAT= TimEs, Mar. 29, 1992, at B7.
149. Id. The SOSUS system works off of underwater listening devices called "hydro-
phones." In the 1950s, hundreds of hydrophones were placed in the North Pacific at 5-
to 15-mile intervals along cables on the seafloor. Land-based computers recorded and
analyzed underwater noise to track Soviet submarines. Id.
150. Id. Testing the SOSUS system would probably take three months and $500,000,
and additional research and equipment could bring the cost of implementing the sys-
tem to track pirate fishing boats to $2 million, a figure outside the budget of the
National Marine Fisheries Service. Id.
151. Otto Kreisher, Center to Offer Data on Suspicious Cargo Ships, SAN Dinro UNION-
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of the Russian Federation to the treaty will ease the enforcement burden
of the other three countries, and technology such as SOSUS and the
National Maritime Intelligence Center may assist in the battle against
pirate fishing.
The vastness of the North Pacific Ocean, however, seems to be an
insurmountable barrier. Enforcement measures at sea are not enough.
Furthermore, there is still the problem of nonsignatory fishing in the
North Pacific. If a nonsignatory boat is discovered fishing for salmon on
the North Pacific, signatories can stop it, because customary international
law recognizes the state-of-origin's control over anadromous fish through-
out their migratory range.' 54 The signatory can probably escort the non-
signatory vessel out of the treaty area and notify its home state, but there is
no guarantee that the home state will take action against the offending
vessel. 15 5
The 1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty's method of enforcement at
sea is substantially the same as that of the pre-1992 anadromous fish agree-
ments.' 5 6 The failure of those treaties to protect and conserve salmon
stocks adequately prompted the negotiation of the 1992 Treaty. The draft-
ers of the treaty recognized the need for additional enforcement measures
to compensate for the impossibility of adequate enforcement by ocean
patrols. It was hoped that regulations regarding reflagging and the devel-
opment of a certificate-of-origin program would fill the gaps left by at-sea
enforcement.
B. Enforcement on Land
The 1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty requires all signatories to enact
domestic legislation to prevent their fishermen from "reflagging," or regis-
tering their boats in another country to avoid the prohibitions of the
treaty. 15 7 Nonsignatories, however, are under no obligation to comply
with the 1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty's prohibitions against reflag-
ging. Some international conventions already attempt to limit reflagging,
but they have met with little success.
One of these international conventions is UNCLOS, which requires a
"genuine link" between a ship and the state whose flag it flies.15 8 A similar
requirement is imposed by the 1986 United Nations Convention on Con-
ditions for Registration of Ships, which is not yet in force, but which serves
as evidence of some states' policies regarding flags of convenience.
1 59
State practice, however, does not comport with this policy. A 1986 study
estimated that forty percent of seagoing vessels were registered under flags
154. Burke, supra note 2, at 118.
155. See, e.g., supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
156. See 1952 North Pacific Convention, supra note 19, art. X.
157. 1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, art. IV(3).
158. UNCLOS, supra note 50, art. 91(1).
159. See United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, art. 9,
10, U.N. Doc. TD/RS/CONF/28 (1986), reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1229 (1987); William
Tetley, The Law of the Fag "Flag Shopping "and Choice of Law, 17 TuL. MAP. Lj. 139, 173-
76 (1998).
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of convenience.1 60
It is unlikely that the signatories will be able to catch all of their ves-
sels that attempt to reflag as nonsignatories. State practice shows that the
signatories cannot expect help in preventing nonsignatories from issiuing
flags of convenience.16 1 Also, as the signatories enter specific agreements
with other states prohibiting salmon fishing in the North Pacific, nothing
in those agreements requires those states to prevent their vessels from
reflagging under the jurisdiction of other nonsignatories. 162 Anti-reflag-
ging provisions should be an express part of future treaties banning
salmon fishing on the high seas.
Another on-land enforcement measure of the 1992 North Pacific
Salmon Treaty is a certificate-of-origin program directed at salmon mar-
kets. The executive director of the Canadian Salmon Marketing Council
once commented that the way to combat pirate fleets is through the exter-
nal affairs department (i.e., trade administration), rather than through
ocean patrols.' 63 The certificate-of-origin program attempts to implement
this strategy.
States commonly use certificates-of-origin to establish the source of
products on the market.'6 They can be used either to give preference to
or to restrict trade with certain countries.165 Depending on the origin of a
product, countries impose different tariffs or other trade barriers to either
encourage or discourage trade with that particular country of origin. In
the context of trade in anadromous fish, for certificate-of-origin purposes,
the origin of the fish is determined by the registration of the vessel catch-
ing the fish. The origin determines not just the tariff an importing coun-
try would impose, but also whether that fish product could be legally
imported at all.
Article III of the 1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty mandates parties
to "take appropriate measures ... to prevent trafficking in anadromous
fish taken in violation of the prohibitions provided for in this Conven-
tion... ."166 One of the charges to the NPAFC, the international commis-
sion created by the treaty, is to assist the signatories in implementing a
certificate-of-origin program which would prove that anadromous fish
bought on the market were caught legally.167 Modern technology, in the
form of a computer that analyzes fish scales, can identify where a salmon
fish was hatched, thereby legitimizing determinations of origin.
168
160. Tetley, supra note 159, at 173-74.
161. See id.
162. See supra part Im.B.
163. Hamilton, supra note 108.
164. Bernard Hoekman, Rules of Origin for Goods and Service: Conceptual Issues and
Economic Considerations, 27J. WoRLD TRADE 81, 82 (1993).
165. Id.
166. 1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, art. I1(3).
167. Id. art. IX(7).
168. Frederick Case, Sharing Science, SEATrLE TiMEs, July 2, 1990, at B1.
The machine takes a picture of the scale, and a frame grabber in the computer
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The United States already has certificate-of-origin programs for tuna,
plants and animals listed as endangered species, and textiles.' 69 However,
these programs certify the legality of imports to the United States.170 A
salmon program would be different because it would certify the legality of
U.S. exports.' 7 ' The U.S. government would have to work with states that
import salmon from the United States or other countries with legal
salmon fisheries to ensure they have adequate rules to certify that the
imported salmon is a legal export 72
The problem with this approach is the time and expense required to
negotiate individual agreements with importing countries. Not only must
the United States form these agreements, but so mustJapan, Canada, and
the Russian Federation. The difficulty of this approach is illustrated by the
experience of the United States. In 1990, even before the creation of the
1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty, Congress authorized the Department
of State to negotiate and the Department of Commerce to implement a
certificate-of-origin program for anadromous fish products.' 73 The
Department of Commerce has not yet established such regulations
because Congress required the Department of State first to negotiate the
needed agreements with foreign governments, and it has not yet done
so.174 Therefore, five years after congressional authorization, there are no
certificate-of-origin programs for anadromous fish products.
An alternative to individual negotiations is to use the NPAFC, the
international body created by the 1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty, as a
regional organization with the power to negotiate for all the signatories.
This unified approach would save time and expense, and it would also
avoid the fragmentation and disorganization that would otherwise main-
tain opportunities for fish laundering through states who have not yet
negotiated certificate-of-origin programs.
Another potential problem with a certificate-of-origin program is that
disputes as to the actual origin of the product may arise. For example, if
salmon are caught by a nonsignatory nation but are brought into a signa-
Fish scales have treelike "growth-rings," and the pattern varies according to
environment and heredity. This information is stored in the computer so scien-
tists can make comparisons to ascertain which river or hatchery district a fish
came from.
Id.
Senator Murkowski commented on this technology during the hearing before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: "Unfortunately, that salmon I bought [in Sin-
gapore] did not turn out to be an Alaskan salmon. The National Marine Fisheries did
an identification. But it was a Washington State salmon, bred in one of the Washington
rivers. It's amazing what they can do with those scales in their studies." Senate Hearing
supra note 30, at 14.
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tory nation for processing and export, there is a dilemma as to which state
is the country of origin. The prevailing international standard for deter-
mining origin focuses on the place of the last substantial transformation,
"i.e. the country in which the last substantial manufacturing or processing
occurred, deemed sufficient to give the product its essential character."'175
States can set specific rules as to how much production must be con-
ferred on a product in a state in order for that state to qualify as the coun-
try of origin.' 76 The goal is to prevent simple packaging or other
superficial processes from determining origin.' 77 For certificate-of-origin
programs to be successful for anadromous fish products, signatories will
have to establish unambiguous rules as to whether processing of fish
within a signatory country can grant country of origin status. If so, then
these rules must also address what minimum amount of processing must
be completed. Having a signatory as the country of origin would allow the
fish to be imported into other countries in compliance with negotiated
certificate-of-origin programs under the 1992 Treaty.
If salmon can only be imported into foreign countries if it has a certif-
icate-of-origin from a signatory country, then it is possible that salmon
laundering schemes will continue, but with a twist. Salmon will probably
be caught by fishermen from nonsignatory countries and illegally sold to
dealers within signatory countries. Those dealers, claiming that they origi-
nally caught the fish, will then obtain a certificate-of-origin, allowing them
to export the fish to foreign countries that refuse to import salmon with-
out such certificates.
Without constant vigilance, market programs such as the certificate-
of-origin program will be circumvented by imaginative criminals. In the
meantime, consumers will bear the costs of instituting these restrictions on
trade. Of course, this depends on whether the signatories to the 1992
North Pacific Salmon Treaty can negotiate these agreements at all. Unless
the signatories adopt an organized approach to negotiating certificate-of-
origin programs, perhaps through the NPAFC, it is doubtful that such pro-
grams could reduce trafficking in illegally caught salmon. Furthermore, if
the signatories adopt different rules or standards for such programs, there
will be an incentive to launder illegal catches in the country with the most
relaxed standards at the expense of the true country of origin. Conse-
quently, it is important that the signatory countries coordinate the imple-
mentation of certificate-of-origin programs.
Conclusion
The addition of on-land enforcement provisions to the 1992 North Pacific
Salmon Treaty is an improvement over the old 1952 North Pacific Conven-
tion. Although provisions regarding enforcement at sea have remained
essentially unchanged, actual enforcement stands to be improved because
175. Hoekman, supra note 164, at 84.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 85.
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the addition of the Russian Federation has widened the territorial reach of
enforcement vessels, even with its fuel shortages and accompanying
problems. Additionally, technology such as aerial photography, radar, sat-
ellite capability, SOSUS, and the National Maritime Intelligence Center
will all aid the fight against illegal salmon fishermen.
However, even with added ocean patrols, the immense size of the
North Pacific Ocean favors pirate fleets. The addition of on-land enforce-
ment measures has improved signatories' capabilities to combat trafficking
in illegally caught salmon, but without a strong commitment to implement
and enforce these measures, they will be ineffective.
The 1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty elicited the signatories' com-
mitment to enact domestic legislation to prevent reflagging of fishing ves-
sels, but issuing flags of convenience is such a widespread practice that the
effectiveness of this legislation is doubtful.
The major improvement in the new treaty is the addition of market
enforcement provisions. These empower the signatories on a second
front, beyond the ocean. A certificate-of-origin program would be a great
aid to the prevention of trafficking in illegal salmon. However, such a
program is unlikely to be effectively implemented without coordination
through the NPAFC. With NPAFC coordination, the certificate-of-origin
program will be a great aid in the prevention of trafficking in illegally
caught salmon by using the market to fill the gaps left by ocean patrol
enforcement. However, there will still be many opportunities for traffick-
ers to circumvent the program and to continue laundering salmon. With-
out coordination and vigilance, the program will be ineffective. Only
through commitment and concerted effort can the North Pacific coun-
tries reserve for themselves the benefits of their salmon-their natural
resource.

